on this item. Herter had demurred, stating Eisenhower's commented the basic LS passion. We has character of a an additional LS statement would hearten mose who are opposed to immoderate. General Assembly action and "might well temper otherwise more violent public reactions." from Algerian supporters. He therefore proposed issuing the following statement:

"In the light of President Eisenhower's statement of September 17 on Algeria, the United States delegation to the present General Assembly of the United Nations naturally hopes that no action will be taken here which would prejudice the realization of a just and peaceful solution for Algeria such as is promised by General de Gaulle's far reaching declaration with its provision for self-determination by the Algerian people."

Merchant, Satterthwaite, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Wilcox, and Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs Berding concurred (Cahto I, September 19; Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/9-1959) Herter included this statement in a September 22 luncheon address before the U.N. Correspondents' Association in New York; see American Foreign Policy. Current Documents, 1959, pages 1100-1101.

That evening, Acting Representative at the United Nations Wads worth reported that upon receiving advance copies of Herter's state ment, the African delegations had disliked the phrase "no action will be taken," since it appeared to endorse de Gaulle's comments completely. Several noted the omission of any reference to the FLN in de-Gaulle's statement and suggested Herter's remarks sanctioned it. Most liked the reference to self-determination, but some felt its impact was diminished because it was mentioned after de Gaulle's address Guinean Representative Diallo noted the emerging African nations would examine the U.S. comments with great care, and would probably interpret them as endorsing France, Tunisian Representative Slim and Moroccan Representative Aboud feared the U.S. statement would harden Egyptian and other extremist opposition and thus make mod eration more difficult for the North African states. The Arab delegations had no reaction. (Delga 38, September 22, Department of State Central Files, 110 11-HE/9-2259)